Iran Hints of Nuclear Flexibility

In a March statement marking 35 years since the signing of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, President Bush called on signatories to adhere to the treaty. “We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international security,” he said. “We must therefore close loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.” The statement was aimed at Iran, which had failed to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the depth of its nuclear activities.

Despite the president’s words, the administration appears to have little faith in using the NPT as a mechanism for restricting Iran. Typically the US would lobby other nations to strengthen the NPT and act against potential treaty violators before the NPT’s five-year review, which will be held throughout this month in New York. However, for the first time in more than 15 years, the conference will open without a prearranged agenda. And according to sources at the State Department, little has been done to promote US interests at the meeting. Without a strong US presence, the likelihood of an impasse at the conference is high, says Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. If the treaty fails, he adds, it “could lead to a cascade of countries deciding to develop nuclear weapons.” Says Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA director general, “It is clear that recent events have placed the NPT … under unprecedented stress.”

Five main topics are expected to dominate the review: intrusive IAEA inspections, UN Security Council penalties for countries that breach the NPT, tighter controls on stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the failure of the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear weapons stockpiles, and Iran’s nuclear program.

Only after Iran agreed to tougher IAEA inspections did the scale of the country’s activities become apparent. The US hopes that France, Germany, and the UK can, through the threat of sanctions and the promise of trade agreements, persuade Iran to give up its uranium conversion facility (UCF) at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the Natanz enrichment facility. That is a false hope, says Cirincione, who recently attended a workshop on nuclear technology in Tehran organized by the Iranian government. “The Iranians consider the economic agreement an insult. … They need something more than that, such as access to Generation IV reactor technology … and they don’t want to give up their enrichment facilities.”

At the workshop, Hassan Rohani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, said he would consider selling stakes in the Natanz and Esfahan facilities, according to Jeffrey Boutwell, executive director of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The increased scrutiny would make it harder for Iran to divert material for military uses. “What Iran needs to do is build trust and transparency, to show that their nuclear program is a peaceful one, and Rohani expressed a willingness to look at several possibilities,” Boutwell says.

Currently Iran has voluntarily suspended work at the UCF and Natanz, although under article IV of the NPT any member state has the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear fuel. And the nuclear weapons states are obligated to assist them, says arms control expert Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky of Stanford University. “The Iranians are objecting to being singled out as having an intent to develop nuclear weapons,” he says. “They voice no objections to strengthening the NPT, as long as the changes apply to everybody.”

Says Boutwell, “Rohani did make it clear that Iran’s current suspension of uranium enrichment activities is just that—temporary—and that Iran intends to follow through with a full civilian nuclear power program, as allowed by article IV.” In fact, Iran has publicly stated that if the US succeeds in persuading the IAEA to refer Iran for discussion by the UN Security Council, the only body that can implement global sanctions, then Iran will immediately reactivate its production facilities. Within two to five years Iran could have enough material for a nuclear power plant—or a bomb.