Constraining potential bomb builders

Carrigan replies: Ahmad Shariati makes several valid points in his letter, but most of them are not logical extrapolations from my argument.

For example, he writes that any branch of science or mathematics could be implicated in the process of building nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional weapons or of hacking into computer systems. That is true: Whatever can be used can be misused, and every branch of science is therefore potentially at risk of being hijacked for malevolent purposes.

Shariati thinks that condition must necessarily lead to a “knowledge nonproliferation treaty” to keep the people that do not possess knowledge to create nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons from obtaining it. But that is in direct contrast to my own conclusions. I wrote, and still believe, that “it is unlikely that the international community can stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons knowledge altogether,” or stop the spread of any other type of scientific knowledge. My research indicated that a driven state will find ways to acquire the tacit and explicit knowledge it needs. For precisely that reason I proposed not a knowledge nonproliferation treaty but several steps that might help the international community better track the spread of nuclear weapons knowledge and thereby have a better understanding of who is working on what.

On Shariati’s final question, I agree most completely. Attempting to stop proliferation is simply treating a symptom; the disease itself—the political and security drivers motivating states to acquire nuclear weapons—must also be addressed. But I think it is wise to treat both the symptom and the disease simultaneously, especially in this case. I am well aware that nonproliferation policies do not present a final solution to the problem of nuclear weapons, but I also believe it would be negligent to ignore proliferation entirely to focus on quelling states’ desires for nuclear weapons.