Roots and risks of total nuclear disarmament

Drell replies: In my article I emphasized the need for “a mechanism for international control of the entire [nuclear] fuel cycle at all stages.” Establishing such a mechanism will be critical to making substantial progress toward a world without nuclear weapons. “Demilitarization of fissile materials,” as urged by Alexander DeVolpi, would be one of the important measures requiring cooperative enforcement.

As to Jonathan Katz’s concerns about potential dangers in a world without nuclear weapons, I am also gravely concerned that with the spread of nuclear know-how, materials, and weapons, we face a growing danger of their falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations and enabling mass murder on an unprecedented scale. In today’s world, relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. Achieving a world of zero nuclear weapons cannot mean returning to the world of pre-1945. Knowledge of nuclear weapons will still exist, as will the capability to reconstitute them.

Getting to zero will take hard work on policy and technical issues. It will require an international consensus on strict compliance-monitoring procedures that are considerably more intrusive than achieved so far. A framework for increasing mutual trust and transparency was established by the comprehensive data exchanges and on-site verification measures negotiated in the New START treaty, and I am optimistic that detection of reconstitution efforts will be possible, as is essential by the time zero is achieved.

Those who see hope for a safer world without nuclear weapons need to get to work on eliminating them. My article is a call to action to meet that goal.